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The Search for Caring and Justice: The 
Social Functions of Medicine and Law 
Larry I. Palmer 
Media reports about the marvels and moral dilemmas of 
modem medicine as well as scholarly critiques of legal 
responses to medicine's new dilemmas reflect a groping for a 
new definition of the relationship between medicine and 
law. I want to join this discussion by suggesting that we 
ought to view the argument concerning that relationship 
not as an intractable conflict between two professions but as 
a communal search for caring and justice. I suggest that par-
ticipants in these debates frame the issues facing medicine 
and law within that broader social context-an institu-
tional context. 
Posing the right question is an essential feature of any 
social response to the moral and ethical dilemmas in medi-
cine and law. We are not simply searching for better health 
care or even a more humane medicine. Rather, we are 
searching for concepts that relate our ever-increasing tech-
nological capacity to the basic bonds that hold human 
societies together-a basic concept of caring. When that 
search for a new understanding of caring creates conflicts, 
society increasingly turns to law, not to find the right secu-
lar answer, but to discover a new form of social harmony-
a basic concept of justice. 
It seems appropriate to view legal conflicts involving 
medicine in terms of failure of care. It further seems appro-
priate to define care broadly as encompassing the whole 
range of physicians' roles, from healer to technician, and 
the entire panoply of services provided by institutionalized 
medicine. As individuals who may become patients our-
selves, we want more than mere technical competence from 
medicine when we are sick. Most of us want the empathy of 
another human being, as well as a cure, whether we suffer 
from a slight cold or terminal cancer. Although modem 
physicians are inculcated with the ethos of science, our ide-
alized image of the physician remains that of the caring 
"healer," who would bring the greatest insights of modem 
science to the patient's case but would also alleviate the 
patient's suffering with emotional and perhaps even spir-
itual support. 
When faced with conflicts involving the practice of 
medicine, we, as laypersons, want law to embody some 
notion of"justice." We know, however, that there is wide-
62 
spread moral confusion and uneasiness about modem medi-
cine's role, and we are thus uncertain about which ideas 
should guide the search for just results. Some people view 
the concept of justice as derived from ideals about law's 
obligation to protect individual liberty of action. Others 
hold a conception of justice that derives from ideals about 
the law's obligation to provide equality-here, of treat-
ment. Still others evaluate decisions by whether the result 
helps to enforce those values, such as "respect for life," that 
are necessary for a just society in the long run. 
Existing legal analyses cannot resolve the underlying 
moral and social issues in medicine or, for that matter, 
provide us with new ways of thinking about the social func-
tions of medicine. As an alternative I want to propose an 
institutional approach that focuses on the functions of medi-
cine and law. 
Medicine from an Institutional Perspective 
We should think of medicine first and foremost as a formal 
institution within society rather than as individual profes-
sionals engaged in certain activities. From that perspective 
medicine is a complex pattern of behavior centering on 
society's concept of what illness is. 
In viewing medicine from the institutional perspec-
tive, we need first to take into account the forces shaping 
modem medicine. Among those forces are increasing spe-
cialization among health care professionals, the emergence 
of a variety of organizations that together constitute medi-
cine as an institution {for example, hospitals, abortion 
clinics, mental hospitals, HMOs), and third-party insur-
ance, the primary method of financing health care in our 
society. In addition to those, the force that has overriding 
influence on the behavior of health care professionals and 
patients is the ethos of science. 
Over the past forty years developments in bioengineer-
ing, clinical pharmacology, and molecular biology have 
radically changed modem medicine and, consequently, the 
way health care is provided in the United States. {Iron-
ically, with those advances in knowledge and technical 
capacity we have become more aware of what remains 
unknown about medical intervention.) Developments in 
the biomedical research laboratory heavily influence what 
the medical practitioner does. The modem scientific 
approach to medicine claims that the advancing tech-
nologies resulting from that research justify risk taking and 
the investment and will eventually lead to greater improve-
ments in health and well-being for society. 
The public, however, is increasingly uncomfortable 
with that scientific ethos of modem medicine. The most 
poignant manifestation of discomfort is the growing con-
cern that medicine has now gained control over the process 
of death itself, destroying the concept of a "natural death." 
That discomfort reveals society's lack of consensus about 
the purposes of modem medicine. While most individuals 
no longer accept preservation of life at all costs as a goal of 
medicine, we are as yet unwilling to embrace an alternative 
goal that allows medical professionals actively to "dispense" 
death in certain cases. 
Law from an Institutional Perspective 
From an institutional perspective law should be viewed as 
designed both to preserve the social order and to allow its 
evolution. The evolutionary function of law in relation to 
modem medicine must be emphasized because the dynamic 
force of medicine is transforming the entire social order; its 
influence on our ideas of life, death, and health is inesti-
mable. At the same time, law also has an influence on 
behavior (even when there is no active legal intervention), 
since it is an integral part of society's and the individual's 
consciousness of the social order. Legal professionals adjudi-
cate disputes, promulgate rules and policies, and administer 
regulations in accordance with some implicit and explicit 
concepts of the social order's evolution. 
Adopting that institutional perspective would change the 
role of legal intervention in health care decisions dramat-
ically. Judges, lawyers, legislators, and administrative offi-
cials would first seek to understand the social and 
organizational context of the controversy before making 
any decisions regarding medicine. As legal decision makers 
come to understand the larger social context, they will rec-
ognize that law's influence on medical practice is necessarily 
limited, while law's influence on medicine's role in the 
social order is potentially very great. Rather than seek to 
regulate the individual doctor-patient relationship, law 
would aim to influence and direct the institutional structure 
of modem medicine. The ultimate goal of such an approach 
would be to increase the capacity of health care organiza-
tions, particularly hospitals, to regulate the doctor-patient 
relationship themselves, since law is, or should be, a last 
resort for maintaining the social order. 
Law and Medicine from an Institutional Perspective 
This institutional approach builds on some of the more 
profound scholarly critiques of law and medicine. Those 
critiques have argued that law's current reliance on the con-
cept of informed consent as the moral and ethical basis of 
legal decision making in the medical arena is misplaced for 
two reasons. 
First, granting to an individual the power to be a sole 
decision maker concerning a severe physical or mental ill-
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ness has destructive social and psychological consequences. 
When law relies on a model of exclusive decision-making 
power resting in the patient, the decisions lead to psycho-
logical isolation of the patient. The perception of exclusive 
decision-making power is thus anticommunal because law is 
used to fracture others' sense of social connections to the 
person most in need of societal care, the patient. To avoid 
those adverse consequences, law must seek to acknowledge 
a certain amount of its own uncertainty when it intervenes 
in medical decisions and must, therefore, leave ultimate 
decision-making authority uncertain. 1 
A second problem is that the informed consent 
approach does not address the fact that physicians tradi-
tionally rely on silence rather than dialogue in their con-
tacts with patients. The physicians' own doubts in the face 
of the inherent uncertainty of modem medical intervention 
are not shared with patients because such sharing is seen as 
contrary to the physicians' ideal of what it means to be a 
professional. To have true dialogue, both patient and pro-
fessional must come to acknowledge those inherent uncer-
tainties and learn to share the risks of treatment or no 
treatment. 
Given such uncertainty in both law and medicine, I will 
not use existing biological concepts of health or illness. I 
take issue with the conventional view that health ought to 
be viewed primarily as a biological concept. A biological 
concept of health as either the absence of disease or the 
reconstruction of a fracture fits well with modem medicine's 
conception of intervention as its primary task. Further, 
because biological indices are more quantitative, a biolog-
ical definition of health might be useful to those wrestling 
with intractable ethical or policy issues such as uncompen-
sated health care or cost containment. We must recognize, 
however, that the biological conception of health is not 
necessarily congruent with medicine's actual social func-
tions in any given society. 
My institutional approach views health as a relational 
or social concept for two reasons. First, all societies in gen-
eral have some definitions about illness and death that 
relate to their basic beliefs about social relations. A social 
definition of health allows us to understand that the medi-
cal conflicts we increasingly ask law to resolve are not sim-
ply technical questions but matters of our social beliefs. A 
social definition of health, for instance, will help us to 
understand why societies with the same basic form of medi-
cine and a similar legal system to ours (such as Canada and 
the United Kingdom) do not have the same kinds of con-
flicts that we have in this country over issues such as 
malpractice. 
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A second reason for using a relational concept of 
health is that it helps to overcome the assumption implicit 
in most biological concepts that health is a condition that 
scientifically trained physicians dispense. The biological 
conception of health undermines the notion that individ-
uals have some responsibility for self-care and discourages 
full discussion of the role of prevention of illness in the con-
text of modem medicine. 2 A relational concept of health 
emphasizes the social context of doctor-patient transac-
tions, including the fact that many patients do not share 
their physician's view as to the best way to restore health or 
to care for their illnesses. 3 A relational concept of health 
helps us to understand that many legal controversies are dis-
putes about the authority of individuals to take risks with 
their own lives or the lives of their children or wards. 
In addressing specific conflicts in medicine that have 
been brought to law for resolution, I intend to demonstrate 
that more-appropriate social solutions could be achieved if 
those cases were viewed from an institutional focus. I will 
argue that our society would be better able to cope with the 
social and moral implications of those cases if we were ask-
ing questions about the nature of the social order and about 
what we should realistically expect from our various institu-
tions and the organizations within those institutions. 
My goal in analyzing the interaction of medicine and 
law by what I have termed the institutional perspective is to 
help all of us-laypersons, physicians, lawyers-better 
understand what we are trying to achieve through that 
interaction. With a greater understanding of the institu-
tional contexts of both medicine and law, we will resist the 
growing tendency to use polemics in judging individual sit-
uations that are actually part of the larger context. 
Caring and Justice in Individual Disputes 
The search for the high ideals of caring and justice in indi-
vidual disputes partially explains why there is so much con-
flict in the interaction of medicine and law today. The 
concept of caring continues to evolve with successive bio-
medical advances. For some, the advent of test-tube babies 
has challenged their entire concept oflife and health. They 
expect law to offer more than an exegesis of technical legal 
rules. They long for a resolution that both recognizes the 
legitimate interests of others-who may desperately want 
children, for instance-and encompasses their own concep-
tion of how best to respect life. Since law is dependent on 
other social institutions for its evolving notion of the social 
order, it is no surprise that there is no consensus of what jus-
tice is in legal interactions with medicine. 
I do not purport to offer a definitive answer to what 
modem caring or justice is when medicine interacts with 
law at the institutional level. Rather, my contention is that 
the search for those ideals must be kept alive while we 
broaden our perspective to encompass the larger context in 
which conflicts in values are taking place. That perspective 
will help us devise ways of restructuring the fiscal founda-
tions of medicine, reforming the malpractice system, and 
modifying professional education. To illustrate the institu-
tional approach, let me briefly discuss caretaking institu-
tions in our society-how we define them and what their 
responsibilities are. 
Modem culture, including law, enjoins us to "take 
care of" patients. Caring is defined as protecting the "best 
interests" of patients and providing them with the ordinary 
sustenance oflife: food, water, and shelter. That caretaking 
function of medicine is crucial to understanding many legal 
and medical encounters. At an institutional level medi-
cine's caretaking function is so widespread that we consider 
any social ills that require caretaking to be within medi-
cine's jurisdiction. Institutions for the mentally retarded are 
a prime example of organizations infused with that medical 
ethos, although it is not clear whether there are at present 
any medical cures in the traditional sense. On a broader 
social level, a number of institutions provide caretaking in a 
generic sense and thus share with medicine some caretaking 
functions in society. Nursing homes are medically related 
institutions that are clearly caretakers. Families, at least 
with respect to children, are expected to provide the care 
necessary not only to sustain life but also to protect the 
health of their members. 
The caretaking function of medicine and its relation-
ship to the other caretaking institutions in our society are 
best illustrated by examining a specific example. The dis-
pute I want to discuss involves the issue of withholding 
medical treatment in one of the early cases. 
Joseph Saikewicz, sixty-seven years old and severely 
retarded, was discovered to have an incurable form of leu-
kemia. His case presented two additional problems that 
made him a difficult patient: his mental retardation was so 
severe that he was unable to speak, communicating with 
others only by gestures and grunts. His IQ was estimated to 
be ten, and, according to the court's opinion, he had a 
mental age of two years, eight months. 4 In other words, by 
the time his case came to court, Joseph Saikewicz was a 
"silent patient. "5 Furthermore, the members of his avail-
able immediate family expressed no interest in attending 
the hearing that decided the course of his treatment. So no 
one provided the physicians with traditional family support 
in dealing with a life-threatening condition. Joseph 
Saikewicz had effectively become a ward of the state-the 
state institution had become his parent and his family. 
The lawsuit technically began when Joseph Saikewicz's 
caretaker, the superintendent of the institution where he 
lived, asked the court to appoint someone other than him-
self to decide whether the potentially life-prolonging treat-
ment, chemotherapy, should be administered in that case. 
After a hearing in which the judge listened to the testimony 
of the attending physicians and the attorney for the state 
institution, the court agreed with the recommendation of 
the court-appointed guardian that Saikewicz should not 
receive chemotherapy, the normal treatment for his form of 
leukemia. While the judges who heard the case discussed 
several legal doctrines, their real reasoning was that the 
adverse and unpredictable effects of chemotherapy were not 
worth the efforts to prolong Saikewicz's life. The court 
reached that remarkable decision despite repeated dis-
avowals that it was based on the perceived quality (or lack 
of quality) of Joseph Saikewicz's life. The physicians, for 
instance, informed the court that in all probability 
Saikewicz would have to be restrained in order to receive 
the intravenous treatments and that that could affect their 
potential for success. The court admitted that some of the 
medical testimony about the ability of older patients to 
withstand the side effects of chemotherapy was, at best, 
questionable. 6 Nonetheless, the judges, lawyers, and physi-
cians seemed convinced that it was in Joseph Saikewicz's 
"best interests" to die rather than endure the pain of che-
motherapy treatments, realizing that he did not under-
stand the reasons for the treatments or his pain and that 
there was a "low chance at producing remission. "7 
The question of withholding treatment would be diffi-
cult to answer in any sixty-seven-year-old patient with an 
incurable form of cancer, but until recently very few people 
would have thought legal intervention could help the situa-
tion. Given the complicating factors in Joseph Saikewicz's 
case, one suspects that the administration of the retarded 
person's institution sought legal intervention not in search 
of greater wisdom but as a way of sharing professional and 
moral confusion about law and medicine's caretaking 
functions. 
The court in Saikewicz may have assumed that the 
institution for the mentally retarded shared the same 
broadly defined goals as the hospital for cancer treatment, 
since both organizations are frequently called hospitals. The 
function of facilities for the mentally retarded-actually 
called hospitals in some states-is unclear because the rea-
sons for placing individuals in them are varied and unclear. 
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In the traditional sense a mentally retarded person is not 
someone with a disease that can at present be cured. At 
best, conditions of mental retardation can be ameliorated 
by positive social and medical intervention, but, in fact, 
living in a state institution for the mentally retarded gener-
ally causes deterioration of the patient's condition. Such 
institutions become places that provide care for those whose 
families and other institutions in society are either unwill-
ing or unable to do so. 
In addition, Joseph Saikewicz's fate was shaped by the 
prospect that were he to enter a hospital for cancer treat-
ment, his grunting, gestures, and possible physical restraint 
would prove disturbing to the professionals who have an 
image of the "good patient." All doctors would agree 
abstractly with the proposition that the hospital ought to 
care for its patients, but Saikewicz appeared to require too 
much care. In a sense, he was the kind of patient whom 
medicine, as an institution, wants to reject as unsuitable 
since other social institutions, particularly the family, have 
given up. Medicine's caretaking function seems to take for 
granted a readily available supporting mechanism outside of 
medicine that cares for the patient's health and thus shares 
medicine's goal for the person at risk. Such a support mech-
anism appeared lacking in Saikewicz's case, and that lack 
may explain why he was rejected for treatment. 
Conclusion 
Law must recognize that other social institutions have care-
taking functions that must be differentiated from, rather 
than merged with, those of medicine. By analyzing from the 
institutional perspective decisions such as those to with-
draw treatment, law can encourage us to resist the tendency 
to equate care with medical treatment. Thus conflicts that 
involve families and nursing homes, for instance, require 
courts to define the caretaking functions of those other 
institutions in relation to medicine. Finally, the attempt to 
deinstitutionalize mentally disabled and mentally ill persons 
and integrate them into small-scale community-based orga-
nizations points out the need to increase the caretaking 
capacity of society so that those individuals enjoy the max-
imum benefits of membership in the human family. With a 
clearer delineation of functions we will be less anxious to 
look to medicine for solutions to every social problem that 
involves some disability. 
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